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INTRODUCTION 
In March 2008, Chesapeake Energy Corporation (Chesapeake) 
pivotally announced its discovery of a profitable method for 
extracting natural gas from the mineral-rich Haynesville Shale in 
northern Louisiana.1 Although the Haynesville Shale has long been 
known for its extraordinarily rich natural gas reserves, until 2008, 
scientists were unable to access the wealth it contained.2 Once 
Chesapeake announced its findings, a “gas rush” ensued in which 
dozens of companies dispatched agents, known as “landmen,” to 
obtain mineral leases on the land.3 This gas rush sparked 
considerable unrest in the Haynesville area—both courtrooms and 
records rooms in northern Louisiana filled to the brim as landmen 
searched for the true owners of the valuable mineral rights.4  
A flood of litigation followed Chesapeake’s discovery as 
individuals and corporations alike vied for a piece of the 
Haynesville pie.5 This litigation highlights an alarming practice 
involving real estate transfers. Likely anticipating the windfall 
resulting from the Chesapeake discovery, many sellers of property 
have quietly and creatively attempted to exclude mineral rights from 
the sales of their properties. Imagine the following, typical scenario: 
Buyer purchases from Seller real estate in northern 
Louisiana under a typical sale conferring full warranty of 
title. Suddenly, as a result of the Haynesville Shale rush, 
landmen are knocking on doors all around the parish, 
promising overnight fortune. When no one knocks on 
Buyer’s door, Buyer learns that according to the warranty 
deed, the sale of the land was made “subject to servitudes 
of record” and that, at the time of the sale, a third-party 
corporation owned the mineral rights pursuant to a mineral 
servitude. Seller now argues that this language served as 
notice of the third-party corporation’s mineral servitude, 
which was recorded in the public records. As a final stab, 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by MARTHA THIBAUT. 
 1. Ben Casselman, U.S. Gas Fields Go from Bust to Boom, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 30, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124104549891270 
585.html [http://perma.cc/6DW3-M3C8] (archived Mar. 3, 2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Adam Nossiter, Gas Rush Is On, and Louisianians Cash In, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jul. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/us/29boom.html?hp=&page 
wanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4BNM-K2QF] (archived Mar. 3, 2014). 
 5. E.g., Cascio v. Twin Cities Dev., LLC, 48 So. 3d 341 (La. Ct. App. 2010); 
Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Trust v. El Paso E & P Co., L.P., 773 F. Supp. 2d 
640 (W.D. La. 2011); Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 46 So. 3d 751 (La. Ct. App. 
2010); Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234 (La. 2010). 
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Buyer learns that the third-party owner is actually Seller’s 
wholly owned and operated corporation.  
This scenario brings to light a number of unresolved legal issues 
residing at the intersection of Louisiana’s law governing both sales 
and corporations. First is the issue of whether the seller’s “subject to 
servitudes of record” declaration is sufficient notice of a preexisting 
mineral servitude to preclude the buyer’s claim for breach of the 
warranty against eviction.6 Although the Civil Code requires that the 
seller warrant against eviction—that is, promise that the buyer will 
obtain ownership and maintain peaceful possession of the thing—
this obligation does not apply to encumbrances “declared” at the 
time of the sale.7 At present, neither jurisprudence nor doctrine has 
articulated how precise a declaration must be to relieve the seller of 
liability for breach of the warranty against eviction.8 Second, if the 
seller is found liable for breach of warranty, the question then 
becomes whether a court should award the buyer traditional 
damages or instead force the seller’s “alter ego” corporation to 
transfer the mineral rights to the buyer.9 Although a corporation’s 
separate identity generally protects it from the obligations of its 
shareholders, courts must decide whether to “pierce the veil” to 
prevent a shareholder from using a wholly owned corporation to 
thwart the law.10  
A recent trilogy of cases in the Louisiana Second Circuit Court 
of Appeal—Tealwood Properties, L.L.C. v. Succession of Graves, 
Coleman Group v. Burgundy Oaks, and Spillman v. Gasco, Inc.—
addressed both of these questions.11 The fact that these cases have 
all arisen in the past two years highlights the escalation of the 
importance of this area of the law and the lack of clarity involved in 
                                                                                                             
 6. See discussion infra Part II. 
 7. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2500 (2014) (“The seller warrants the buyer 
against eviction, which is the buyer’s loss of, or danger of losing, the whole or part 
of the thing sold because of a third person’s right that existed at the time of the 
sale. The warranty also covers encumbrances on the thing that were not declared 
at the time of the sale, with the exception of apparent servitudes and natural and 
legal nonapparent servitudes, which need not be declared.” (emphasis added)). 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. “Veil-piercing” is a remedy whereby the court disregards the corporate 
entity in cases where the corporation’s dominant shareholder is using the 
corporation “to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend 
crime.” Glazer v. Comm’n on Ethics for Pub. Emps., 431 So. 2d 752, 758 (La. 
1983). 
 11. Tealwood Props., L.L.C. v. Succession of Graves, 64 So. 3d 397 (La. Ct. 
App. 2011); Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C., 71 So. 3d 352 (La. Ct. App. 
2011); Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
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the issues presented.12 Further, despite the fact that the cases 
involved strikingly similar issues and were all brought before the 
same circuit, the results are inconsistent, evidencing that courts are 
struggling to apply the law to the unprecedented issues.13  
This Comment provides courts with the comprehensive analysis 
needed to tackle these questions, not only in light of existing law but 
also in light of the interests at stake. Part I dissects the Second 
Circuit trilogy and highlights the inconsistencies and inaccuracies 
contained in those decisions. Parts II and III set forth the analytical 
framework that courts should use when addressing similar cases in 
the future. In particular, Part II addresses the seller’s obligation to 
warrant the buyer against eviction and argues that because the law 
places a burden on the seller to unambiguously express his or her 
obligations to the buyer, routine “servitudes of record” provisions do 
not satisfy the seller’s obligations in warranty. Finally, Part III 
explains the balancing of interests that must be undertaken when 
applying veil-piercing circumvention theory and argues that veil-
piercing is appropriate when corporations are used to evade the 
seller’s duty to the buyer. This Comment concludes that in such a 
case, it is proper for the court to “pierce the corporate veil” and 
transfer the mineral rights to the buyer by making the seller’s “alter 
ego” liable for the seller’s warranty obligations.  
I. A COMMON TREND: THE SECOND CIRCUIT TRILOGY 
The three Second Circuit cases discussed in this Section all paint 
a similar picture: The plaintiff in each bought real estate and sought 
recompense for the defendant–vendor’s alleged failure to disclose a 
preexisting mineral servitude.14 In each scenario, the mineral rights 
were reserved by the defendant–vendor’s “alter ego” corporation 
through a transaction executed prior to the act of sale with the 
plaintiff.15 With few, if any, previous cases dealing with these 
particular issues, existing precedent provided little guidance for the 
courts. As a result, the Second Circuit’s reasoning in the three 
decisions is largely inconsistent and undeveloped. 
                                                                                                             
 12. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 399; Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 353; Spillman, 110 So. 
3d at 152. 
 13. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 399; Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 353–54; Spillman, 110 
So. 3d at 159. 
 14. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 399–400; Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 353–54; 
Spillman, 110 So. 3d at 152–53. 
 15. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 400; Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 353–54; Spillman, 110 
So. 3d at 152–53. 
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A. Tealwood Properties, L.L.C. v. Succession of Graves 
In the first case, Tealwood Properties, L.L.C. v. Succession of 
Graves, the determination of whether the sellers breached the 
warranty against eviction was straightforward.16 The Graves 
affirmatively conveyed, under full warranty of title, the mineral 
rights to the land to Tealwood Properties, LLC (Tealwood).17 
However, third-party and co-defendant Dale Oil Company (Dale) 
owned a preexisting mineral servitude to the land and thus held the 
mineral rights that the Graves purported to convey.18 Because Dale’s 
recorded ownership dispossessed and evicted Tealwood from the 
mineral rights, the Graves were clearly liable to Tealwood for 
breach of warranty against eviction.19 
The relationship that existed between the two defendants, the 
Graves and Dale, is what makes Tealwood a noteworthy case. 
Tealwood alleged that the Graves, who were sole owners and 
managers of Dale, were mere “alter egos” of the company; in 
particular, Tealwood alleged that the Graves were using the 
corporation as a protective shield to retain the mineral rights despite 
their agreement to sell the same mineral rights to Tealwood.20 The 
public records doctrine protects the recorded ownership of third 
parties, like Dale, when a seller purports to convey their property.21 
                                                                                                             
 16. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 399. 
 17. The deed contained the following provision: 
Vendor does hereby convey and transfer any and all rights to oil, gas and 
other minerals lying on or under said property except any production 
produced by that certain well named F.A. Baker No. 4, having Serial No. 
163340, exploration by Novy Oil & Gas Company, Inc., which is hereby 
reserved by Vendor. 
Id. at 399–400. This express conveyance of the mineral rights is an important 
factual distinction between Tealwood and the other two cases. See infra Part I.B–
I.C. 
 18. Ms. Meeker, the mother of the Graves, conveyed the mineral rights to 
Dale Corporation in August 1990. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 400. The tract of land 
was sold in December 1990 in a separate transaction to the Graves. Id. 
 19. As opposed to Coleman and Spillman where it was in question whether 
the warranty against eviction had been breached, it is without question that the 
failure to transfer ownership of a thing expressly conveyed under warranty would 
create a cause of action for the plaintiff. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2500, 2506 
(2014). 
 20. The appellate court opined that the trial court could find that the plaintiff 
intended to purchase the mineral rights possessed by the defendants and the 
defendants could not escape their obligation through their wholly owned LLC. 
Tealwood alleged that the Graves were sole owners of Dale. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d 
at 400, 407–08. 
 21. See A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 6.23, in 4 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 405 (3d ed. 2004) (“[A] valid recorded instrument 
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Thus, although the Graves would be liable for breach of warranty, 
they would maintain ownership of the valuable mineral rights that 
Tealwood sought to purchase with the land. However, the Second 
Circuit found it inequitable to treat Dale as a true “third party” and 
held that the Graves and Dale could be treated as the same person 
for the breach of warranty claim through veil-piercing doctrine.22  
Veil-piercing, the court asserted, is a flexible doctrine through 
which a court may prevent a shareholder from taking advantage of a 
corporation’s separate identity when it “appears to be blocking a just 
result.”23 The court adopted Professor Glenn Morris’s 
“circumvention” veil-piercing theory, which allows the court to 
“pierce the veil” and disregard the separate existence of a corporation 
to prevent the shareholder of the corporation from avoiding some 
restriction on his or her own freedom of action.24 The Second Circuit 
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, stipulating that if the 
plaintiff offered sufficient evidence of Dale’s alter ego status with the 
Graves, the trial court should pierce the veil to require Dale to fulfill 
the warranty obligations of the Graves, specifically to transfer the 
mineral rights to the plaintiff.25  
Two judges in Tealwood did not sign the majority opinion.26 Of 
particular note is Judge Moore’s dissent, which suggested that veil-
piercing was inappropriate because the defendants had not behaved 
fraudulently; thus, Moore opined, Tealwood lacked a legitimate 
cause of action against Dale.27 
                                                                                                             
 
establishing a predial servitude may be asserted against the acquirer of the servient 
estate.”). 
 22. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 407. 
 23. Id. at 406 (quoting Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the Corporate Veil in 
Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 271, 271 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24. The restriction on the Graves’ own freedom of action that they sought to 
usurp was the inability to warrant the sale of the minerals and retain ownership of 
the same minerals. Id. (citing Morris, supra note 23). It is important to note here 
that the alter ego nature of the corporation or L.L.C. is sufficient to pierce the 
veil—fraud and misuse being irrelevant—where the dominant shareholders or 
members use the veil of the corporation’s separate personality to do something 
that they could not lawfully do themselves. See supra note 10. 
 25. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 407–08. 
 26. Id. at 408. 
 27. The only cause of action Tealwood might have had against Dale—
fraud—had prescribed. Id. at 410 (Moore, J., dissenting). Moore further noted that 
Tealwood waited until the emergence of Haynesville Shale exploration and 
development to bring its claims. Id. at 409–10. By pointing this out, he is either 
arguing that the intention of the buyer was not to obtain mineral rights until he 
later discovered their value or that the buyer should not be rewarded after failing 
to give more attention to the public records. Moore wrote the majority opinion in 
Spillman, and he made similar statements in that opinion, although he claimed he 
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B. Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C. 
In the second case of the trilogy, Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, 
L.L.C., a number of residential homeowners (the Coleman Group) 
brought breach of warranty against eviction claims against their 
seller Burgundy Oaks LLC (Burgundy) after learning that the 
property they had purchased did not include valuable mineral 
rights.28 Unlike the sellers in Tealwood, Burgundy did not expressly 
convey the rights to minerals.29 Various deeds were involved; some 
provided that the land was sold subject to servitudes of record and 
others contained no “subject to” language at all.30 The court, 
however, treated them all the same and did not address the varying 
legal effects these deeds trigger.31 
A mineral servitude was, in fact, recorded in the local parish 
records, and the defendants asserted that this put the plaintiffs on 
notice that they were buying the land without the mineral rights.32 
Similar to the seller and third-party corporation in Tealwood, the 
“third-party” owner of the recorded mineral servitude in Coleman 
was a limited liability company nearly wholly owned by the 
sellers.33 The two defendants shared common office space, common 
administration, and a centralized accounting system.34 The Coleman 
court adopted the Tealwood veil-piercing analysis and held that 
“[i]nferences most favorable to [the] plaintiff drawn from the 
undisputed facts” suggested that the conveyances of the mineral 
rights to the third-party company were meant to disguise the 
reservation of mineral rights.35 
                                                                                                             
 
was not overruling Tealwood. See Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012); infra Part II.B. 
 28. Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C., 71 So. 3d 352, 353–54. (La. Ct. App. 
2011). 
 29. Id. at 353. 
 30. At least one of the examined deeds declared that the land was “subject to 
the easements, set back requirements and other real rights, running with the land . . . 
and further subject to the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, as 
amended, filed in the record of Caddo Parish, Louisiana.” Id. at 355 (emphasis 
omitted). Other deeds, however, provided more broadly that the land was conveyed 
“subject to all recorded servitudes, restrictions, rights-of-way and easements.” Id. 
Finally, at least one deed did not contain any “subject to” language at all. Id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at 357. 
 33. Id. at 353. 
 34. Id. at 356. 
 35. Id. 
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The Coleman court did not examine the issue of whether the 
seller breached the warranty against eviction in detail.36 However, 
the court did conclude that the warranty against eviction had been 
breached.37 After determining that the veil-piercing theory could be 
used to show the lack of distinction between the seller and its wholly 
owned corporation, the court reasoned that the seller could not 
obligate himself to deliver the thing sold and warrant title and then, 
by his own act or claim, derogate from or assert rights to the thing 
contrary to his obligations.38 Although the court did not explicitly 
address the sufficiency of the “subject to servitudes of record” 
language, an implicit aspect of the court’s holding is its assumption 
that the provisions did not exclude the sale of the mineral rights.39 
As discussed below, the Spillman court did not so readily accept this 
assumption. 
C. Spillman v. Gasco 
In the final case, Spillman v. Gasco, the sale at issue was made 
with full warranty of title, and the act of sale included a provision in 
the warranty deed stating that the sale was subject to “any 
restrictions, easements and servitudes of record.”40 As in Tealwood 
and Coleman, the seller—Gasco—failed to transfer the mineral 
rights to the buyer because another individual, Frank Scott Moran, 
owned a recorded mineral servitude that burdened the property.41 
The plaintiffs alleged that Moran was either the sole or majority 
stockholder of Gasco and that, like the “third-party” defendants in 
Tealwood and Coleman, Moran was not a true third party to the 
warranty deed.42 The plaintiffs sought a judgment enforcing the 
warranty and requiring Moran to transfer the mineral rights to them 
by piercing Gasco’s corporate veil.43 
Although Spillman was decided less than a year following the 
Second Circuit’s decisions in Tealwood and Coleman and involved 
almost identical facts, the analysis in Spillman is remarkably distinct 
from the court’s previous two decisions.44 The Spillman court was 
                                                                                                             
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 357. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. The mineral servitudes were properly recorded at the time in the 
public records. Id. at 353. 
 40. Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 152 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 41. The sale and mineral reservation between Moran and Gasco occurred in 
July 1999; the sale of the land between Gasco and the plaintiffs occurred in April 
2001. Id. 
 42. Id. at 152–53. 
 43. Id. at 152. 
 44. The Coleman decision, Judge Moore asserted, did not address the “subject 
to” language in the deed, and this distinction justified the Spillman court’s 
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the first to squarely address the issue of whether the “servitudes of 
record” language adequately disclosed the third-party ownership of 
the mineral servitude.45 Judge Moore, who authored Spillman and 
dissented in Tealwood, agreed with the Spillman defendants that the 
“servitudes of record” language was unambiguous and sufficient to 
put the plaintiffs on notice that they were buying property subject to 
servitudes recorded in the public records.46 He substantiated his 
decision by surmising that it was common practice in residential lot 
transactions to use general “subject to” language regarding 
restrictions and nonapparent servitudes that would not affect its 
intended use as residential property.47 
Because Judge Moore concluded that a breach had not occurred, 
the buyer was not entitled to a remedy.48 In dicta, however, Judge 
Moore also rejected the veil-piercing analysis of the Second 
Circuit’s prior decisions.49 Restating his dissent in Tealwood, Judge 
Moore held that veil-piercing was inappropriate where the plaintiffs 
failed to show that the defendants had engaged in any “nefarious 
act.”50 Essentially, this rejection of veil-piercing assumed that fraud 
is the sine qua non for piercing the veil. 
D. Significance of the Second Circuit Split 
Although the Spillman court failed to acknowledge the true force 
of its decision, it effectively overturned Coleman by refusing to 
grant the plaintiff a remedy under the similar factual circumstances 
presented in these cases.51 The implicit holding in Coleman was that 
the warranty against eviction was breached by the seller’s failure to 
declare mineral servitudes with specificity, whereas Spillman found 
similar “servitudes of record” language adequate to put the plaintiffs 
on notice that their sale was limited.52 Much of the debate in 
Spillman centered on whether a blanket disclosure of “servitudes of 
                                                                                                             
 
departure from that case. Id. at 154–55. Judge Moore next distinguished Tealwood 
because the warranty deed in that case had a specific provision that expressly 
conveyed some mineral rights and withheld certain others. Id. at 158. 
 45. Id. at 154. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 158. 
 48. Id. at 158–59. 
 49. Id. at 159. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Spillman distinguished Coleman but did not overrule the case outright. Id. 
at 158 (“We conclude that Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, Inc., supra, is not 
controlling in this case.”). 
 52. Id. at 159. 
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record” sufficiently notified the buyer of the mineral servitude’s 
existence, while Coleman mostly ignored this issue.53 Tealwood 
stands alone in that the warranty deed in that case expressly 
conveyed the mineral rights to the land.54 
Thus, no court has fully and adequately explained the law on 
warranty with regard to the sufficiency of broad “servitudes of 
record” language. Tealwood and Coleman attempted to reconcile the 
issues of fairness and injustice that the facts of these cases presented, 
while Spillman clearly sought not to upset the purportedly common 
practice of using these blanket statements.55 However, the 
prevalence of mineral servitudes in resource-rich Louisiana ensures 
that this issue will arise again in the future and will likely be 
litigated due to the high value of the mineral rights at stake. Without 
certainty in the law, sellers are deprived of clear guidelines as to the 
language necessary to be relieved of their warranty obligations. This 
will almost certainly lead to future litigation, with no clear answer 
for judges faced with these issues and no guidance for the private 
settlement of disputes.  
Moreover, the courts in Tealwood and Coleman both held that 
veil-piercing was an appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs where the 
seller and its corporation were alter egos.56 The reasoning of these 
cases adopted Professor Morris’s circumvention veil-piercing 
theory, which stands for the proposition that individuals cannot do 
through their corporations what they cannot do themselves.57 In 
Spillman, however, Judge Moore suggested that veil-piercing is 
inappropriate where the seller’s actions are not fraudulent or 
“nefarious.”58 Ultimately, he rejected the notion that circumventing 
the law and one’s own contractual obligations through an alter ego 
is alone sufficient to justify piercing the veil. If, however, the 
absence of “nefarious” or fraudulent acts precludes a court from 
piercing the veil, shareholders will be able to thwart their contractual 
obligations through the shield of corporate identity. The Spillman 
court failed to acknowledge the altered doctrine in circumvention 
veil-piercing cases, which considers a different balancing of policies 
than the court recognized. 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. at 157–59. See generally Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C., 71 So. 
3d 352, 355 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 54. Tealwood Props., L.L.C. v. Succession of Graves, 64 So. 3d 397, 400 (La. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
 55. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d 397; Coleman, 71 So. 3d 352; Spillman, 110 So. 3d 
at 157–59. 
 56. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 405; Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 357. 
 57. See supra Part I.A–C. 
 58. Spillman, 110 So. 3d at 159. 
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II. RETHINKING SUFFICIENCY OF DECLARATIONS IN WARRANTY 
AGAINST EVICTION 
Tealwood, Coleman, and Spillman all implicated the seller’s 
warranty against eviction and, in particular, the seller’s obligation to 
disclose the existence of nonapparent servitudes such as those 
granting mineral rights to third parties.59 Thus, the proper resolution 
of those cases, and the many analogous cases that are sure to come 
in the future, requires a complete analysis of the scope of the seller’s 
warranty against eviction as it pertains to mineral servitudes. 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2475 sets forth the obligations of 
the seller, and among those obligations is the seller’s duty to warrant 
the buyer “ownership and peaceful possession of . . . the thing” 
sold.60 This article imposes the warranty against eviction61 on the 
seller by law, even without a contractual stipulation to that effect.62 
Proper analysis of a claim for breach of the warranty against 
eviction involves two distinct steps. First, it must be determined 
whether the buyer has been evicted.63 Second, if an eviction has 
occurred, then the buyer’s remedies must be determined according 
to the act of sale and the buyer’s knowledge of the danger of 
eviction.64 
A. Scope of the Warranty Against Eviction: The “Thing” Covered 
The obligation to warrant against eviction is further delineated in 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2500. Article 2500 defines “eviction” 
                                                                                                             
 59. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d 397; Coleman, 71 So. 3d 352; Spillman, 110 So. 3d 
150. 
 60. “The seller is bound to deliver the thing sold and to warrant to the buyer 
ownership and peaceful possession of, and the absence of hidden defects in, that 
thing. The seller also warrants that the thing sold is fit for its intended use.” LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 2475 (2014). 
 61. “To evict is, properly speaking, to take something from a person, in virtue 
of a sentence. Evincere est aliquid vincendo auferre. An eviction is the 
abandonment, which one is obliged to make, in pursuance of a sentence, by which 
he is condemned to do so.” R.J. POTHIER, TREATISE ON THE CONTRACT OF SALE § 
83, at 50 (L.S. Cushing trans., 1839). Pothier’s definition captures the traditional 
Roman law notion of eviction, for it involved eviction through a judgment. DIAN 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES § 10:14, in 24 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE 418 (2012). Now, however, a judgment is not required for an 
eviction to arise where there is a “danger” of losing the thing. Id. § 10:5, at 418–
19. 
 62. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 21, § 6.23, at 407. The warranty against 
eviction is “implied in every sale unless modified or excluded by the parties.” 
TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:1, at 415. 
 63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2500 (2014). 
 64. Id. art. 2503. 
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as “the buyer’s loss of, or danger of losing, the whole or part of the 
thing sold because of a third person’s right that existed at the time of 
the sale.”65 This definition sets forth three important elements of 
eviction. First, by defining eviction as the buyer’s “loss of, or danger 
of losing,” the thing, no civil action is required for the buyer to be 
evicted; if a third party lawfully asserts a right to the property, the 
buyer is thus evicted automatically.66 Second, the eviction may be in 
“whole” or in “part.”67 Partial eviction arises when the buyer is 
evicted from only part of the thing sold and may still make use of 
the thing without this portion of the property.68 And finally, the 
rights of the third party must have existed prior to the sale.69  
Although article 2500 makes clear that the seller’s obligations in 
warranty extend to encumbrances on the property, the obligations of 
a seller in fact turn on the type of encumbrance at issue.70 For 
certain types of servitudes, it is the buyer’s duty to be aware of 
them, and as such, the seller does not warrant their existence.71 
These include legal servitudes—those established by law for the 
benefit of the public—and natural servitudes—those created by the 
natural situation of estates.72 The seller need not declare natural and 
legal servitudes because the buyer is deemed to have knowledge of 
these encumbrances; they are set forth in the laws of the state, and 
all persons are bound to know the law.73 In addition to natural and 
legal servitudes, the seller need not declare the existence of apparent 
conventional servitudes in order to escape the obligation of warranty 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. art. 2500 (“The seller warrants the buyer against eviction, which is the 
buyer’s loss of, or danger of losing, the whole or part of the thing sold because of a 
third person’s right that existed at the time of the sale. The warranty also covers 
encumbrances on the thing that were not declared at the time of the sale, with the 
exception of apparent servitudes and natural and legal nonapparent servitudes, 
which need not be declared.”). 
 66. “It is true that actual eviction is not necessary, ‘if a perfect title exists in 
some third person, whereby it is rendered legally certain that his vendor had no 
title.’” Bickham v. Kelley, 110 So. 637, 640 (La. 1926) (quoting Robbins v. 
Martin, 9 So. 108, 112 (La. 1891)). See also art. 2500; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & 
GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:3, at 417. 
 67. Art. 2500. 
 68. Id. art. 2511; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:3, at 
417–18. 
 69. Art. 2500. This “definition makes clear that the seller does not warrant the 
buyer against acts committed by trespassers.” TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, 
supra note 61, § 10:3, at 417. See also id. § 10:6, at 421. 
 70. Art. 2500. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. arts. 654, 659. 
 73. Id. art. 2500; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:12, at 
433. The law establishes legal servitudes for the benefit of the general public or 
particular persons. Art. 659. The vendor does not implicitly warrant the non-
existence of legal servitudes. Id. art. 2500. 
2014] COMMENT 987 
 
 
 
against eviction.74 The reasoning behind this limitation is that it is 
incumbent on the buyer to examine property and know what he or 
she is buying.75 
Unlike those servitudes of which the buyer is deemed to have 
knowledge, article 2500 requires a seller to “declare” the existence 
of nonapparent conventional servitudes that burden property and 
thereby inform the buyer of the limits of the seller’s ownership.76 
The purpose of the declaration is to notify the buyer of nonapparent 
conventional servitudes that limit the seller’s ownership where a 
diligent buyer would not readily perceive their existence.77 If the 
vendor does not sufficiently declare a nonapparent conventional 
servitude that burdens the property, he or she warrants its non-
existence.78 
Importantly, however, the declaration requirement and its 
exceptions all concern the buyer’s knowledge. If a buyer has actual 
knowledge of an encumbrance, he or she “has not suffered any 
failure of cause for which relief should be granted.”79 Therefore, if a 
buyer is aware of a nonapparent conventional servitude despite the 
seller’s failure to sufficiently declare its existence, “he is not 
evicted—he gets exactly what he expects.”80 
Mineral servitudes are generally conceived of as nonapparent 
conventional servitudes if there are no perceivable signs of their 
existence on the property.81 Thus, so long as no visible signs exist to 
                                                                                                             
 74. Art. 2500. Conventional servitudes are created by juridical act and 
destination by the owner. Id. art. 697. 
Predial servitudes are either apparent or nonapparent. Apparent 
servitudes are those that are perceivable by exterior signs, works, or 
constructions; such as a roadway, a window in a common wall, or an 
aqueduct. Nonapparent servitudes are those that have no exterior sign of 
their existence; such as the prohibition of building on an estate or of 
building above a particular height. 
Id. art. 707. 
 75. It is the “buyer’s business not to be ignorant,” and he or she cannot claim 
warranty against apparent servitudes on the property. Richmond v. Zapata Dev. 
Corp., 350 So. 2d 875, 880 (La. 1977). Likewise, the jurisprudence recognizes a 
fourth exception for declarations of which the buyer is aware. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT 
& GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:12, at 433. 
 76. Richmond, 350 So. 2d at 880; Dillon v. Morgan, 362 So. 2d 1130, 1132 
(La. Ct. App. 1978); Herring v. Price, 4 So. 2d 17, 20 (La. Ct. App. 1941); art. 
2500. 
 77. Richmond, 350 So. 2d at 880; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra 
note 61, § 10:12, at 431. 
 78. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 21, § 6.23, at 407. 
 79. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:12, at 433. 
 80. Id. § 10:12, at 434. 
 81. Richmond, 350 So. 2d at 880; Dillon, 362 So. 2d at 1132; Herring, 4 So. 
2d at 20. 
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give the buyer notice of the mineral servitude, the seller is obligated 
to declare the existence of the servitude or must compensate the 
buyer for breach of the warranty of title should the buyer be 
evicted.82 Thus, the critical question is whether language in an act of 
sale is a sufficient declaration to relieve the seller of the obligation 
to warrant against eviction. 
B. Determining the Sufficiency of Declarations 
The Civil Code does not explain what is sufficient, and the case 
law—particularly the conflicting Coleman and Spillman decisions—
illustrates the difficulty that courts face when addressing this area of 
the law. 
1. Declarations in Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Traditional 
Notions 
The Civil Code provides for the warranty against eviction to 
safeguard the buyer, and the doctrine and jurisprudence interpreting 
warranty law consistently focus on this purpose.83 Article 2474 puts 
the burden on the seller to define his or her obligations in warranty: 
The seller “must clearly express the extent of his obligations arising 
from the [warranty] contract, and any obscurity or ambiguity in that 
expression must be interpreted against the seller.”84 In relation to the 
warranty against eviction, French doctrine has interpreted the 
obligation to impose an obligation on the seller to give detailed 
declarations to effectuate actual notice of an encumbrance under 
article 2500. Planiol wrote that the seller “should declare with care 
in the act all charges, servitudes, or other rights which exist on the 
property sold, which are not apparent.”85 Therefore, although neither 
                                                                                                             
 82. The mineral servitudes at issue in Tealwood, Coleman, and Spillman were 
nonapparent. See Tealwood Props., L.L.C. v. Succession of Graves, 64 So. 3d 397, 
400 (La. Ct. App. 2011); Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C., 71 So. 3d 352, 353–
54 (La. Ct. App. 2011); Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 156–57 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
 83. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2503 (2014). In the scenario where the seller 
limits the warranty and the buyer is evicted, the seller must still return the price of 
the thing. There are three exceptions to this rule: (1) where the buyer clearly was 
aware of the danger of eviction, or (2) the buyer has declared that he or she is 
buying at his or her peril and risk, and (3) where the seller’s obligation has been 
expressly excluded. Thus, the buyer must exclude his or her obligation in 
warranty, and the buyer must either be aware of the danger of eviction or buy at 
his or her peril and risk. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:20, 
at 446. 
 84. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2474 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 85. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, PART 1, at 833 (La. St. 
Law Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959) (emphasis added). 
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the Louisiana Civil Code nor French doctrine specifies precisely 
how declarations must be made, every indication is that it is the 
seller’s duty to fully explain the existence of nonapparent 
conventional servitudes.86 This burden on the seller is practicable 
because the seller, not the buyer, is in the best position to know the 
extent of his or her ownership. In light of this obligation, it may be 
deduced that broad, omnibus “servitudes of records” provisions do 
not meet the standard set forth in the doctrine simply because of 
their lack of specificity. 
Additional considerations also lead to the conclusion that 
omnibus declarations fail to relieve the seller of responsibility in 
warranty. A declaration referring generally to recorded servitudes, 
without detailing individual servitudes with specificity, assumes that 
the existence of a servitude in the public records is sufficient to 
defeat a warranty claim. However, recordation is required to ensure 
that the servitude is effective against third parties to the act, 
including a later buyer of the property burdened by the servitude.87 
Thus, the warranty against eviction can apply to recorded servitudes 
only—a non-recorded servitude cannot be asserted against the 
buyer.88 Moreover, both doctrine and jurisprudence89 have made 
clear that the “constructive notice” afforded by the public records is 
insufficient to relieve the seller of his or her obligation to declare the 
existence of nonapparent conventional servitudes.90 In sum, 
although the buyer is charged with the knowledge of natural and 
legal nonapparent servitudes, as well as apparent conventional 
                                                                                                             
 86. Before the 1993 revision, Louisiana Civil Code article 2474 required that 
the seller “explain” his or her obligations to the buyer, and that language has been 
changed to “express.” Nonetheless, the redactors have indicated that the change in 
terms was not meant to change the law. Art. 2474 cmt. a. 
 87. YIANNOPPOLOUS, supra note 21, § 6:23, at 405. 
 88. Id. 
 89. In Richmond v. Zapata Development Corp., after reviewing French 
doctrine on the sufficiency of declarations, the Supreme Court asserted that 
“[b]ecause the registry laws are intended only as notice to third parties and have 
no application whatever between parties to a contract, a vendee is under no 
obligation to search the record in order to ascertain what his vendor has sold and 
what it has not.” Richmond v. Zapata Dev. Corp., 350 So. 2d 875, 878 (La. 1977). 
 90. “Though it is sometimes said that the recordation of an instrument gives 
constructive notice to the world, a buyer ought not to be treated as though he has 
knowledge of an encumbrance just because it is recorded.” TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & 
GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:12, at 435. See also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 21, 
§ 6:23, at 405; Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 155 (La. Ct. App. 2012); 
Collins v. Slocum, 317 So. 2d 672, 681 (La. Ct. App. 1975); New Orleans & 
C.R.R. v. Jourdains Heirs, 34 La. Ann. 648, 651–52 (La. 1882). 
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servitudes, the buyer is not charged with knowledge of nonapparent 
conventional servitudes simply because they are recorded.91  
In light of the well-established rule that constructive notice is 
insufficient as actual notice to the buyer, it is apparent that the broad 
“declarations” used by the sellers in Coleman and Spillman merely 
informed the buyer that there is notice through the public records. 
These provisions do nothing more than put the buyer on notice of 
what is recorded—notice he or she already has by law as 
“constructive notice” and which is insufficient to convey “actual 
notice.” Spillman’s holding completely subverts this well-
established principal of warranty law. If the seller may not escape 
his or her obligations in warranty through constructive notice, yet 
the seller may declare the existence of servitudes by indicating that 
notice through the public records is available, then the seller is 
essentially escaping his or her liability in warranty through 
constructive notice. 92  
In practice, permitting sellers to escape warranty obligations 
through “servitudes of record” provisions would completely 
supplant warranty doctrine by deeming constructive notice sufficient 
to give actual notice to the buyer.93 Thus, stating that there are 
servitudes without informing the buyer of any actual servitudes94 
and instead charging the buyer with knowledge of those found in the 
public records is clearly inadequate.95 At the very least, these 
omnibus declarations do not meet Planiol’s requirement that the 
seller declare “with care” the limitations of his or her obligations.96 
It is unfair to the buyer for the seller to portray that the underlying 
transaction is protected under warranty and to use these omnibus 
clauses to escape all warranty obligations with respect to servitudes. 
                                                                                                             
 91. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 21, § 6:23, at 405; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & 
GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:12, at 435. 
 92. Similarly, in the case Phillips v. Parker, the Supreme Court noted that the 
public records are not sufficient to deprive a possessor of their “good faith” status. 
Phillips v. Parker, 483 So. 2d 972, 976 (La. 1986). The Court reasoned that to 
impose constructive knowledge as notice to the possessor and thereby implicate 
lack of good faith, the “theory of constructive notice would write ten-year 
acquisitive prescription completely out of the Code.” Id. at 977. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 152 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 95. Indeed the public records are available and put all third persons on notice 
of those transactions therein recorded; so, such a statement would not change the 
law. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 21, § 6:23, at 406–07. 
 96. See, e.g., Richmond v. Zapata Dev. Corp., 350 So. 2d 875, 880 (La. 
1977). 
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2. Declarations in “Practice” 
There is some evidence that the French doctrine requiring the 
seller to carefully declare any encumbrances burdening property is 
not followed in practice. In his practice guide, Louisiana real estate 
expert Peter Title sets forth two examples of declarations of 
encumbrances that may be used in real estate transactions.97 The 
first example is detailed and, by chance, involves a declaration of 
mineral servitudes on the land: 
Mineral reservation with Release of Surface Rights referred 
to in Act of Cash Sale by __________ to __________ 
recorded on __________ at COB __________, Folio 
__________, in the official records of the Parish of 
__________, State of Louisiana.98 
Peter Title suggests that it is “good practice” for the seller to 
provide specific declarations in the act of sale to prevent the buyer 
from attempting to rescind the sale due to an undisclosed 
encumbrance.99 He does not, however, indicate that detailed 
declarations are required by law. Rather, he concedes that at times 
the seller will only give a “blanket declaration” of encumbrances 
and indeed provides a form for such a declaration: 
This sale is made subject to any servitudes, rights of way, 
mortgages, judgments, liens, mineral leases and any other 
instruments or encumbrances of record in the Records of 
__________ Parish, Louisiana, affecting the property hereby 
conveyed by Vendor to Purchaser.100  
Title gives two limitations to the use of blanket declarations. 
First, he suggests that typical blanket declarations are more 
commonly present in transactions between “related persons.”101 
Second, he advises the buyers of property to require the seller to list 
any exceptions to title by reference to the name of the document and 
the recording information as provided in the first, more detailed 
form.102 By advising the buyer to request that the seller give more 
detailed declarations, Title is implying that the burden, at least in 
practice, rests with the buyer. This practice contravenes warranty 
                                                                                                             
 97. PETER S. TITLE, LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 10:33, in 1 
LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES 745 (2007). 
 98. Id. § 10:110, at 805. 
 99. Id. § 10:33, at 745. 
 100. Id. § 10:111, at 806.  
 101. Id. § 10:33, at 745. 
 102. Id. § 10:33, at 745–46. 
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doctrine’s placement of the obligation to describe encumbrances of 
property on the seller. 
In addition to Title’s practice guide, some jurisprudence 
indicates that it is sometimes the practice for warranty deeds to use 
blanket, omnibus declarations of encumbrances in the sales of 
immovable property. For instance, the opinion of the Louisiana 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Fontenot v. Saxby, a case involving 
a claim of breach of warranty in a transaction of exchange, 
discussed such a provision.103 The act of exchange in dispute 
declared that the property was conveyed “subject to any and all 
servitudes, restrictions, mineral leases and reservations on file and of 
record in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana.”104 The court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that no breach 
of warranty had occurred.105 In reaching this holding, the court 
determined that Fontenot failed to set forth evidence that would 
support her claim that she lacked actual knowledge106 of the 
building restrictions that were recorded in the public records.107 
Although the court’s reasoning is unclear, the court apparently 
considered the omnibus provision sufficient to put the buyer on 
notice of the existence of the building restrictions. However, the 
court’s finding that Fontenot had actual knowledge may have rested 
on facts other than this provision, e.g., the fact that the plaintiff 
procured a title opinion clearly stating the existence of certain 
building restrictions.108 Additionally, the court in Fontenot relied on 
a comment to Louisiana Civil Code article 776, which states that 
“[b]y virtue of the public records doctrine, an acquirer of immovable 
property burdened with recorded restrictions is presumed to have 
                                                                                                             
 103. See Fontenot v. Saxby, 34 So. 3d 477 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 104. Id. at 481. 
 105. Id. 
 106. The court wrongly suggested that Louisiana Civil Code article 2503 
precludes a claim for breach of warranty against eviction where the buyer has 
actual knowledge. Id. at 483. The court’s finding that actual knowledge would 
preclude a claim for breach of warranty, however, is not altogether correct. 
Professor Tooley describes a fourth exception to warranty of encumbrances that is 
not expressly provided for under article 2500 but is well established in the 
jurisprudence. This fourth exception arises in circumstances where the buyer has 
actual knowledge that the encumbrance exists. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, 
supra note 61, § 10:12, at 433–34. The court in Fontenot applied the correct 
doctrine, but it was incorrect in the source it provided for the law because article 
2503 only applies to situations where the warranty is limited, and the deed in 
Fontenot did not indicate a limitation of warranty as implied under article 2503. 
 107. Fontenot, 34 So. 3d at 481. 
 108. The title opinion provided: “3.1 Restrictive Covenants were established 
by act dated October 27, 1971, as recorded in Conveyance Book 1168, page 791, 
and also attached to a Cash Sale Deed dated March 16, 1989, recorded under 
Clerk’s file No. 2020478.” Id. at 482. 
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notice.”109 This application of constructive notice to defeat the 
plaintiff’s claim for breach of warranty is inaccurate, however, for 
the reasons discussed above.110  
Additional evidence of the norm of general declarations is cited 
in the Coleman case, where two title attorneys filed affidavits stating 
that mineral rights are not typically mentioned in residential 
deeds.111 One of the attorneys testified specifically that “[p]rior to 
2008 and the publicity surrounding the Haynesville Shale . . . 
purchasers of homes seldom inquired about mineral rights in 
connection with or at the time of closing.”112 
Thus, both doctrinal and jurisprudential evidence suggests that 
omnibus declarations may occasionally be used in practice. This 
development gives rise to the present question of whether these 
provisions sufficiently act as actual notice to the buyer that mineral 
servitudes are not conveyed under the warranty deed. However, the 
fact that sellers are utilizing these blanket declarations does not give 
them legal effect. 
3. Going Forward: A “Reasonableness” Test for Determining 
Sufficiency of Declarations  
The discord between the opinions in Coleman and Spillman 
regarding the sufficiency of omnibus declarations highlights that the 
lack of jurisprudential guidance is troubling courts. The court’s 
reasoning in Spillman reflects a gross error in jurisprudential efforts 
to balance the conflict between tradition and practice. Judge 
Moore’s concerns of rewarding the buyers in Spillman who he 
believed to be indifferent to the minerals at the time of the sale 
resulted in a holding that—moving forward—will empower sellers 
to repeal all warranty law without any expense.113 If “subject to 
                                                                                                             
 109. LA. CIV. CODE art. 776 cmt. c (2014).  
 110. “In reality, judicial declarations concerning constructive notice merely 
restate the rule that a valid recorded instrument establishing a predial servitude 
may be asserted against the acquirer of the servant estate.” YIANNOPOULOS, supra 
note 21, § 6:23, at 405. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 111. Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C., 71 So. 3d 352, 354–55 (La. Ct. App. 
2011). 
 112. Id. at 354. 
 113. Turning to the question of the sufficiency of the declaration, Moore noted: 
We are mindful that the relatively recent Haynesville Shale development 
has dramatically changed the landscape regarding the value of mineral 
rights even for small residential lots. Prior to the Haynesville Shale, 
mineral rights to residential lots were of minimal value, and typically, 
prospective homeowners rarely were concerned with whether their deed 
to a residential lot was subject to a prior mineral reservation, especially 
since the object of their real estate purchase was for residential purposes. 
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servitudes of record” provisions are deemed sufficient to give actual 
notice to the buyer, the seller will never be liable for eviction 
because a buyer can only be evicted by recorded servitudes.114 The 
seller thus escapes liability in warranty without limiting the warranty 
outright and without the seller explaining his or her obligations with 
care as required by article 2474.115 
Moving forward, courts should adopt the test established by 
doctrine: A declaration is sufficient only if it gives a reasonable 
buyer actual knowledge of the servitude encumbering the property 
sold.116 Professor Tooley emphasizes the impact of declarations on 
cause and explains that a buyer with actual knowledge “has not 
suffered any failure of cause for which relief should be granted.”117 
Although actual knowledge of the buyer is the goal of article 2500, 
the article requires only a declaration sufficient to convey actual 
knowledge.118 Thus, if a declaration should have conveyed notice to 
a reasonable buyer that a servitude encumbered the property, the 
seller would not be liable even if the buyer did not know of the 
servitude by his or her own fault. 
Civilian doctrine has always made clear that declarations must 
be made unambiguously and with care, a requirement implying that 
declarations must be made with specificity.119 Mineral servitudes 
present particularly strong reasons for requiring declarations made 
with specificity in order to effectuate actual notice.120 The 
jurisprudential classification of mineral rights as servitudes was 
eventually codified in 1975 in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
31:21 of the Mineral Code.121 Despite the long history of this 
classification, Louisiana remains an outlier among American 
jurisdictions in categorizing minerals as servitudes.122 Therefore, a 
                                                                                                             
 
Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 156 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 114. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 115. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2474 (2014). 
 116. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 117. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:12, at 433. 
 118. See LA CIV. CODE art. 2500 (2014); TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, 
supra note 61, § 10:12, at 431. 
 119. For an example of a declaration made with specificity, see TITLE, supra 
note 97, § 10:110, at 805. For certain types of servitudes, courts may find that 
broad “servitudes of record” provisions do not create liability for the seller. Utility 
servitudes, for example, are for the most part salutary. Thus, the buyer’s cause is 
not affected by their existence, and the buyer will not be able to seek diminution in 
price under article 2506 because the servitude increases the value of the property. 
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2506 (2014). For a discussion of cause, see TOOLEY-
KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:12, at 433. 
 120. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 121. The original classification arose in a Supreme Court case in 1920. See 
Frost-Johnson Lumbar Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (1920). 
 122. 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 191 (2013). 
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layperson or an attorney from another jurisdiction may not be 
effectively notified that the deed concerns rights to minerals by the 
broad term “servitudes.” Coleman and Spillman are at least practical 
examples of the failure of those declarations to effectuate notice.123 
Thus, for many laypersons, the “servitudes of record” provisions 
will not convey actual notice to the buyer that the seller’s ownership 
of the mineral rights to the land is limited. 
Further, although the court in Spillman downplayed the buyer’s 
interest in the mineral rights at the time of the sale, it is likely that 
the buyer’s cause will be affected in most transactions where 
mineral rights are excluded without the buyer’s knowledge.124 As 
opposed to typical predial servitudes and utility servitudes, which 
merely limit an owner’s use of the property, a mineral servitude 
allows the record owner to actually extract a valuable product from 
the land and claim ownership of it.125 Because the value of the 
minerals could far surpass the value of the land itself, it would be 
unreasonable to assume that the buyer’s cause will not be affected 
by an encumbrance affecting the mineral rights. 
Although doctrine makes clear that omnibus declarations do not 
effectively inform the buyer of the existence of servitudes 
encumbering property, equitable concerns also support this 
conclusion. First, putting the onus on the seller is sensible because 
he or she is in the best position to know the extent of his or her 
ownership. This is particularly true where—as was the case in 
Tealwood, Coleman, and Spillman—the servitude is held by the 
seller’s alternate legal personality.126 Second, any argument that this 
replacement is too onerous for the seller can be dispelled as well. If 
a seller does not have actual knowledge of a servitude due to an 
improper declaration by his or her own ancestor in title, the seller 
will be able to pass liability onto his or her own seller.127 The buyer 
will be subrogated to the rights of the seller and thereby enabled to 
pursue remote vendors, thus protecting a seller who is unaware for 
                                                                                                             
 123. Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 152 (La. Ct. App. 2012); 
Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C., 71 So. 3d 352, 353 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 124. Landowners in Louisiana have an interest in these servitudes due to the 
prevalence of mineral wealth in the state. OFFICE MINERAL RES., MARGINAL OIL 
AND GAS PRODUCTION IN LOUISIANA: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF STATE 
ACTIVITIES AND POLICY MECHANISMS FOR STIMULATING ADDITIONAL PRODUCTION 
(2004), available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/mineral/formspubs/Royalty-
Relief-Report-2004_.pdf [http://perma.cc/F85N-XRME] (archived Mar. 3, 2014). 
 125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000). 
 126. See supra Part I. 
 127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2503 (2014) (“The buyer is subrogated to the rights in 
warranty of the seller against other persons, even when the warranty is 
excluded.”). 
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reasons other than his or her own negligence.128 Third, determining 
the sufficiency of declarations based on whether they will give 
actual notice to a “reasonable buyer” should comfort the seller as 
well. Because this is an objective test, it protects a seller whose 
buyer should have been informed by the warranty deed but who by 
his or her own fault is not actually informed—e.g., a buyer who 
does not properly examine the deed.  
The fact that sellers are using overly broad language with little 
effect is a public policy concern for Louisiana. Many deeds will 
likely include broad “servitudes of record” provisions because they 
are simple, cost-free, routine, and may be of some value. Lawyers 
use omnibus provisions as a fallback measure that they can cite to 
try to protect their clients from liability. However, omnibus 
declarations simply do not have the effect intended by most 
attorneys. The consequence of the reasoning in Spillman would be 
the elimination of warranty as to mineral rights in virtually all 
transactions without any cost to the seller—e.g., reduction in the 
purchase price—that might accompany a non-warranty deed.129 
Therefore, courts should apply doctrine in a fashion that would set 
forth a bright-line rule for mineral rights that declarations that 
specifically mention minerals130 are required and omnibus 
provisions are per se unreasonable.131 
C. Determining the Rights of the Evicted Buyer 
Once a breach of the seller’s warranty against eviction is 
established, the second step of traditional warranty analysis is to 
determine how to restore the buyer’s rights in accordance with 
article 2503. When presented with the particular facts of Tealwood, 
Coleman, and Spillman, the issue for the Second Circuit became 
whether the buyer could pursue a remedy not only against the seller 
but also against the seller’s “alter ego.” 
1. Traditional Rights 
The traditional remedies available to a buyer for breach of the 
warranty against eviction depend on several variables.132 First is the 
                                                                                                             
 128. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 61, § 10:10, at 430. 
 129. Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 154–55 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 130. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 131. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 132. Both the extent of the warranty and the buyer’s knowledge control the 
buyer’s warranty claim. The Civil Code weighs so heavily in favor of protecting 
the buyer that it entitles the buyer to rescission of the sale even if he or she had 
actual knowledge of the threat of eviction, but in such a case the buyer cannot seek 
damages. Collins v. Slocum, 317 So. 2d 672, 681 (La. Ct. App. 1975). It is also 
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extent of the warranty at issue. Parties may agree to increase or limit 
the warranty, and they may even go so far as to exclude it.133 If the 
title is under full warranty and a servitude encumbers the land, the 
buyer is only partially evicted.134 If the buyer is partially evicted, he 
or she may obtain either diminution in price or, in some cases, 
rescission of the sale.135 In order to obtain rescission, the magnitude 
of the encumbrance must be such that the court would assume that 
the buyer would not have bought the property if he or she had been 
aware of its existence.136 Although a seller’s failure to declare a 
nonapparent mineral servitude is generally considered partial 
eviction, courts may find that such a breach in the warranty requires 
rescission of the deed plus damages.137 If the buyer is not entitled to 
rescission, he or she maintains the right to diminution in price 
proportionate to the value of the loss because it is assumed that the 
buyer would have paid less for the thing had he or she known of the 
limitation on the purchase.138 
The remedy provided by the Civil Code, then, would afford the 
buyer with the ability to seek some cure for the loss of the mineral 
rights.139 When the third party who holds the rights to the mineral 
servitude is a “true” innocent third party—one whose personality is 
separate both legally and practically from that of the seller—these 
                                                                                                             
 
true in the case of servitudes that even if a buyer acquires actual knowledge by 
searching the public records, he or she is nonetheless entitled to a remedy if the 
seller’s failure to properly declare the encumbrance evicts the buyer. Richmond v. 
Zapata Dev. Corp., 350 So. 2d 875, 880 (La. 1977); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 
21, § 6:23, at 405–10. This further supports this Comment’s conclusion with 
regard to the futility of “servitudes of record” provisions. 
 133. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2503 (2014). They may recover the price paid and the 
value of the fruits that must be returned to the evictor. Id. art. 2506. If the act of 
sale is under full warranty of title and the buyer is evicted, he or she is entitled to 
rescission of the sale and additionally may recover any damages suffered due to 
the eviction. Id. 
 134. Id. art. 2511. 
 135.  
When the buyer is evicted from only a part of the thing sold, he may 
obtain rescission of the sale if he would not have bought the thing 
without that part. If the sale is not rescinded, the buyer is entitled to a 
diminution of the price in the proportion that the value of the part lost 
bears to the value of the whole at the time of the sale. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 136. Collins, 317 So. 2d at 678. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra 
note 61, § 10:11, at 431; see also Art. 2511. 
 137. E.g., Collins, 317 So. 2d at 678. 
 138. Art. 2511; ALAIN LEVASSEUR & DAVID GRUNING, LOUISIANA LAW OF 
SALE AND LEASE: A PRÉCIS 69 (2d ed. 2011); TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, 
supra note 61, § 10:11, at 431. 
 139. See supra Part II. 
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traditional remedies are all the law can afford without disrupting the 
third party’s rights, which the public records doctrine seeks to 
protect. 
2. Creative Resolution 
In Tealwood, Coleman, and Spillman, the sellers virtually held 
the mineral rights through separate legal personalities.140 In 
addressing this distinct set of facts, the court in Tealwood correctly 
identified veil-piercing as a means of requiring the defendants to 
transfer the mineral rights to the buyer.141 Specific performance is 
not listed among the remedies for a buyer whose seller has breached 
the warranty, yet it is alluded to as the solution in Tealwood.142 The 
Civil Code does not list specific performance because the question 
of ownership is one of law and not of fact. If the seller owns the 
property, the seller’s ownership of the mineral servitude would, by 
law, transfer to the buyer upon the act of sale.143 Piercing the veil 
and disregarding the separate identities of the seller and his or her 
third-party “alter ego” would make the third party liable for the 
seller’s obligations.144 Thus, the rights to the minerals would 
transfer by operation of law. Although transferring the mineral 
rights would not normally be a plausible remedy for the buyer, the 
peculiar facts of Tealwood, Coleman, and Spillman allow a court to 
entirely mend the buyer’s eviction. 
III. VEIL-PIERCING 
The judges in Tealwood and Coleman considered it inherently 
inequitable for a vendor to “obligate himself to deliver and to 
warrant title and peaceable possession to [the] buyer of a thing and 
then by his own act or claim to derogate from, or to assert rights to 
                                                                                                             
 140. Tealwood Props., L.L.C. v. Succession of Graves, 64 So. 3d 397, 399 (La. 
Ct. App. 2011); Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C., 71 So. 3d 352, 353 (La. Ct. 
App. 2011) (noting that there was at least “one other person” who was a co-owner 
of the third-party L.L.C. that held the mineral servitude in that case, which may 
call for line-drawing when judges consider the facts of each case); Spillman v. 
Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 152 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 141. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 406–07. 
 142. Id. at 407–08 (“Tealwood has made factual allegations sufficient to state a 
cause of action against Dale ‘for the specific performance of transferring the 
mineral rights’ of the Tract to Tealwood by a reformation of the Deed.”). 
 143. Dillon v. Morgan, 362 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (La. Ct. App. 1978). Of course, 
the peculiarity of Tealwood, Coleman, and Spillman is that the seller actually did 
own the mineral servitude through a separate legal entity also controlled by the 
seller either individually or with one or two other stockholders. Tealwood, 64 So. 
3d at 399; Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 353; Spillman,110 So. 3d at 152. 
 144. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 405–06. 
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the thing contrary to, his obligations.”145 Faced with this clear 
injustice, the courts provided a means through veil-piercing and 
reformation of the deed whereby the plaintiffs could recover mineral 
rights from the defendants despite the availability of other remedies 
to plaintiffs whose vendors breach their warranty.146 This expansion 
of circumvention veil-piercing theory into the realm of warranty 
law—with the goal of creating an equitable solution for the courts in 
mind—is an important exploration of this Comment. If followed, the 
Second Circuit’s use of this theory in Tealwood and Coleman 
extends the remedy available to courts when corporate identity has 
been used to thwart the law to the detriment of others in a 
contractual setting. 
A. “Piercing the Corporate Veil” to Prevent Circumvention of the 
Law 
1. Traditional Veil-Piercing Doctrine 
Corporate identity is a fiction used to achieve many desired 
effects, including limited liability, perpetual life, and simplification 
of ownership.147 Veil-piercing doctrine allows courts to ignore this 
fiction in order to deny the normal legal protections that corporate 
identity affords.148 In particular, the traditional purpose of veil-
piercing is to impose personal liability on a shareholder for a 
corporation’s debts, thereby eliminating limited liability.149 Before 
piercing the veil, however, courts must balance the policies behind 
protecting the fiction of corporate separateness with the facts at hand 
that may compel a more equitable remedy than corporate law would 
normally allow.150 Corporate law strongly favors maintaining the 
separate identity of limited liability companies and corporations.151 
However, courts recognize that this concept of separateness is a 
legal fiction and should be disregarded when corporate identity is 
abused.152 
                                                                                                             
 145. Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 357; Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 408. 
 146. See supra Part I. 
 147. GLENN MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS        
§ 32.01, in 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 50–52 (1999). 
 148. Morris, supra note 23, at 271. 
 149. Id. 
 150. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 2:19 (2004).  
 151. For a critique on single business enterprise analysis and the undermining 
of limited liability, see James Dunne, Taking the Entergy Out of Louisiana’s 
Single Business Enterprise Theory, 69 LA. L. REV. 691, 702–03 (2009).  
 152. Glazer v. Comm’n on Ethics for Pub. Emps., 431 So. 2d 752, 754 (La. 
1983). 
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When deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil, courts often 
use a “totality of the circumstances” test that evaluates a 
corporation’s compliance with corporate formalities, which manifest 
the corporation’s intention to maintain a separate identity from its 
shareholders.153 Ultimately, however, compliance with corporate 
formalities is not dispositive.154 Instead, veil-piercing generally 
requires some wrongdoing on the part of the shareholders to the 
detriment of the corporation’s creditors or its tort victims.155 For 
example, courts will impose liability on the shareholders when there 
is evidence of fraud or deceit or when facts exist demonstrating that 
the corporation abused its status as a separate entity.156 In keeping 
with this trend, Judge Moore cited the lack of fraud or other 
“nefarious” acts of the seller to argue against veil-piercing in both 
his dissent in Tealwood and his majority opinion in Spillman.157  
The hesitance of Louisiana courts to resort to veil-piercing stems 
from the same policies that corporate law seeks to encourage.158 
Shielding shareholders from personal liability promotes commerce, 
entrepreneurship, and industrial growth.159 Similarly, imposing 
personal liability too often may discourage capital contributions to 
corporations because shareholders will not want to expose their 
personal wealth to “the risks of business.”160 However, veil-piercing 
doctrine maintains that it is against public policy to allow a 
shareholder to use a corporation for the sole purpose of shielding 
itself from responsibility to others. 
                                                                                                             
 153. E.g., Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (La. 1991) 
(“Some of the factors courts consider when determining whether to apply the alter 
ego doctrine include, but are not limited to: 1) commingling of corporate and 
shareholder funds; 2) failure to follow statutory formalities for incorporating and 
transacting corporate affairs; 3) undercapitalization; 4) failure to provide separate 
bank accounts and bookkeeping records; and 5) failure to hold regular shareholder 
and director meetings.”). 
 154. See Morris, supra note 23, at 277; Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate 
Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 981 (1971); Elvin R. Latty, The Corporate Entity as a 
Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 MICH. L. REV. 597, 634–35 (1936). 
 155. PRESSER, supra note 150, § 2:19. 
 156. Union Local P-1476 of Amalgamated Meatcutters v. Union Citizens Club 
of Terrebonne, 408 So. 2d 371, 373 (La. Ct. App. 1981). 
 157. Tealwood Props., L.L.C. v. Succession of Graves, 64 So. 3d 397, 408–09 
(La. Ct. App. 2011); Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 159 (La. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 158. PRESSER, supra note 150, § 2:19. 
 159. “The purpose of the insulation and limited liability of shareholders is to 
promote commerce and industrial growth by encouraging them to make capital 
contributions to corporations without subjecting all of their personal wealth to the 
risks of business.” Glazer v. Comm’n on Ethics for Pub. Emps., 431 So. 2d 752, 
757 (La. 1983). 
 160. Id. 
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2. Circumvention Veil-Piercing Theory 
In Tealwood and Coleman, the Second Circuit used 
“circumvention” veil-piercing theory,161 a specific type of veil-
piercing that is unique among other traditional forms because it does 
not impose personal liability on the corporation’s owner.162 Instead, 
the court simply prevents a shareholder from doing through his or 
her corporation that which he or she could not lawfully do 
individually.163 It thus precludes circumvention of the law through 
the legal fiction of corporate separateness.164 
In Glazer v. Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court declared that separate corporate identity is 
a privilege that will not be recognized to permit an individual to foil 
other important public interests that the State seeks to protect 
through either legislation or regulation.165 According to the Court: 
Separate corporate identity is a privilege conferred by law to 
further important underlying policies, such as the promotion 
of commerce and industrial growth. Consequently, the 
privilege may not be asserted for a purpose which does not 
further these objectives in order to override other significant 
public interests which the state seeks to protect through 
legislation or regulation.166 
In Glazer, the Court found that where a conflict of interest 
clearly prohibited Mr. Glazer—a State Mineral Board member—
from transacting individually with certain oil companies, the same 
conflict of interest prohibited Mr. Glazer from doing so through his 
wholly owned corporation, Glazer Steel Corporation.167 Recognition 
of Glazer Steel Corporation’s separate existence from Mr. Glazer for 
that purpose would “be a misuse of the privilege of separate capacity 
                                                                                                             
 161. See Morris, supra note 23, at 311; Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 406; Coleman, 
71 So. 3d at 356–57. 
 162. See Morris, supra note 23, at 311. 
 163. Id. at 310–11. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Glazer, 431 So. 2d at 754. 
 166. Id. 
 167. The Code of Ethics for Governmental Employees specifically prohibits 
any public servant from receiving anything of economic value for or in 
consideration of services rendered to or for any person if such public servant 
knows or reasonably should know that such person has or is seeking to obtain 
contractual or other business or financial relationships with the public servant’s 
agency. Id. at 756. Here, Mr. Glazer was selling steel on a non-bid-negotiated 
basis to seven companies that held mineral leases with the State of Louisiana. Id. 
at 755. Mr. Glazer was the sole shareholder, chief administrative officer, president, 
and chairman of the board of Glazer Steel Corporation. Id. 
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and further none of its proper functions and objectives,” such as 
capacity to enter contracts, sue and be sued, have limited liability, 
and have continuous existence.168 
An earlier Louisiana Supreme Court case, Keller v. Haas, is also 
instructive because it involved facts similar to those in Tealwood, 
Coleman, and Spillman.169 Defendant Haas purchased his co-
owners’ interests in a tract of land at a tax sale and later transferred 
the property to his wholly owned corporation to spoil the co-owners’ 
redemption rights.170 The Court stated that: 
It is well settled that where an individual forms a corporation 
of which he is the sole and only stockholder or owns such 
control of the stock that the act of the corporation is his own, 
that he may not use the screen of the corporate entity to 
absolve himself form [sic] responsibility.171 
The Court disregarded the separate personality of the corporation by 
recognizing the co-owners’ right to redeem their undivided interests 
in the property directly from the corporation.172 
In both Glazer and Keller, the Court did not impose personal 
liability on the corporations’ owners for the corporations’ debts.173 
This limitation on the remedy that the Court provided is important in 
the balancing test that veil-piercing entails. A court that seeks to 
disregard limited liability must find that the corporation’s “alter 
ego” either disregarded corporate formalities or used the corporate 
form to commit fraud.174 However, in Glazer, the Supreme Court 
held that when an “alter ego” uses corporate identity to frustrate an 
important regulatory policy—to circumvent the law—fraud or 
failure to comply with corporate formalities is not required.175 The 
policies that favor protection of corporate identity—e.g., 
encouraging people to invest without risking their personal wealth—
are not compromised.176 Because of this reduced incentive to respect 
corporate identity, the Court is more willing to pierce the veil when 
shareholders are circumventing the law. 
                                                                                                             
 168. Id. at 758. 
 169. Keller v. Haas, 12 So. 2d 238, 239 (La. 1943). 
 170. Id. at 239–40. 
 171. Id. at 240. This language also reflects the negativity with which courts 
used to view solely owned corporations. For further discussion see MORRIS & 
HOLMES, supra note 147, § 32.12, at 92–93. 
 172. Keller, 12 So. 2d at 240. 
 173. Glazer, 431 So. 2d at 757–58; Keller, 12 So. 2d at 240. 
 174. Glazer, 431 So. 2d at 757. 
 175. See id. at 757–58. 
 176. “[T]he same factual scenario may result in recognition of a separate 
corporate identity for some purposes, i.e. insulation of shareholders from liability, 
and a disallowance of the separate corporate entity privilege for others.” Id. at 758. 
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B. Circumvention Veil-Piercing Applied to Warranty Law 
When a vendor breaches the warranty against eviction by 
attempting to retain minerals in property sold through a separate 
corporate entity,177 the court must determine whether to pierce the 
veil to cure the buyer’s eviction by transferring the mineral rights to 
the buyer. Importantly, piercing the veil would provide a remedy for 
plaintiffs that article 2506 does not.178 Buyers who were not put on 
sufficient notice that mineral rights were withheld would be able to 
actually obtain the mineral rights to the land as opposed to obtaining 
either mere rescission of the sale or rescission plus damages. This 
solution provides significant protections for the buyer in the event 
that, for instance, the seller is insolvent. It would require that the 
seller hand over any mineral leases on the property, essentially 
making the buyer the lessor.179  
Whether circumvention veil-piercing was an appropriate remedy 
was the crux of the issue in Coleman and Tealwood, and both found 
in favor of applying this remedy in the warranty setting.180 As 
Coleman pointed out, the seller should not be able to warrant the 
sale of the mineral rights with one hand, while withholding those 
very mineral rights through the veil of his or her corporation with 
the other.181 Judge Moore advocated, perhaps correctly, that the 
vendors did not act fraudulently,182 but his implication that fraud is 
necessary for circumvention veil-piercing cannot be reconciled with 
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decisions in Glazer and Keller. 
Without the threat of veil-piercing as a remedy, a vendor of property 
could legally sell land to itself under the guise of a legal separate 
entity, reserving the mineral servitude. After protecting the mineral 
                                                                                                             
 177. See Tealwood Properties, L.L.C. v. Succession of Graves, 64 So. 3d 397, 
397 (La. Ct. App. 2011); Coleman v. Burgundy Oaks, L.L.C., 71 So. 3d 352, 352 
(La. Ct. App. 2011). But see Spillman v. Gasco, Inc., 110 So. 3d 150, 152 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
 178. Louisiana Civil Code article 2506 does not provide a remedy for specific 
performance. Instead, the buyer may seek rescission of the sale and damages if 
evicted. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2506 (2014). 
 179. Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 407–08. 
 180. See id. at 406–07; Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 356. Other cases, such as Glazer 
and Keller, applied circumvention theory where the defendant had circumvented 
the laws set forth by the Legislature as opposed to private laws created by contract. 
See Glazer, 431 So. 2d 752; Keller v. Haas, 12 So. 2d 238, 239 (La. 1943). 
 181. Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 357 (“The jurisprudence is that a seller should not 
be allowed to obligate himself to deliver and to warrant title and peaceable 
possession to a buyer of a thing and then by his own act or claim to derogate from, 
or to assert rights to the thing contrary to, his obligations.”). See also Tealwood, 64 
So. 3d at 397. But see Spillman, 110 So. 3d at 152. 
 182. Spillman, 110 So. 3d at 152. 
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rights, the vendor could sell the same land and minerals to a buyer 
when, in fact, the land was protected under a “third party’s” 
name.183 Courts’ endorsement of these transactions in which the 
seller lacks fraudulent intent enables sellers to obstruct their own 
contractual obligations and circumvent the contract, which is exactly 
what the Court in Glazer and Keller sought to prevent.184 
Meanwhile, veil-piercing involves a balancing of policies. A 
court must weigh the benefits of corporate personality and 
separateness against the public policies set forth by the Louisiana 
Legislature elsewhere in the law—here, particularly those policies 
the Legislature aimed to establish in the Civil Code articles 
regulating the enforceability of contracts of sale.185 As Professor 
Glenn Morris notes in his treatise on Business Organizations, courts 
are more liberal in granting the veil-piercing remedy in the 
circumvention category of cases because such a remedy does not 
jeopardize limited liability.186 With limited risks to corporate 
identity involved, the reasons weighing against veil-piercing in 
circumvention cases lack real footing. Not only is it unwise and 
unnecessary to allow this type of circumvention of contractual duties 
to take place, but also the danger to corporate interests is low in this 
area, and thus, the policies against veil-piercing are slight. 
Allowing the transactions involved in Tealwood, Coleman, and 
Spillman would promote constructive fraud to avoid delivery of the 
thing sold, one of the primary obligations of the seller under the 
Civil Code.187 Thus, according to the balancing test of Glazer, the 
weight of public policy in contract law and warranty tips in favor of 
using veil-piercing to afford the plaintiffs a remedy. The use of veil-
piercing circumvention theory in cases like these would prevent 
transactions meant to retain ownership of property that has been 
transferred by law. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Haynesville Shale developments brought 
prosperity to many individuals in Louisiana, disputes have also 
arisen as some seek to obtain the fortunes that they feel have been 
wrongfully taken. Certainly, the public records recently became 
                                                                                                             
 183. See Tealwood, 64 So. 3d at 397. 
 184. Coleman, 71 So. 3d at 357 (“The jurisprudence is that a seller should not 
be allowed to obligate himself to deliver and to warrant title and peaceable 
possession to a buyer of a thing and then by his own act or claim to derogate from, 
or to assert rights to the thing contrary to, his obligations.”); Dillon v. Morgan, 362 
So. 2d 1130 (La. Ct. App. 1978). 
 185. Glazer, 431 So. 2d at 757. 
 186. MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 147, § 32.01, at 50–52. 
 187. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2475 (2014). 
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more relevant to the people of northern Louisiana than ever before. 
Where conflict between the deed of sale and the public records 
arises, the law is firmly settled that the buyer should prevail in an 
action for breach of warranty. In light of uncertainty in 
jurisprudence and the tendency among Louisiana vendors to state 
their obligations ambiguously, this Comment suggests that courts 
should structure their decisions regarding sufficiency of declarations 
based on the reasonableness of “subject to” provisions. 
Reasonableness should be judged by the subjective knowledge of 
the buyer and the objective degree of burden or injury that the 
servitude imposes on the property. Omnibus provisions stating that 
the seller’s land is transferred “subject to servitudes of record” are 
wanting, and a seller thus expressing the mineral servitudes on the 
property to the buyer should be liable under the warranty against 
eviction for failing to notify the buyer. 
Finally, the second consideration of this Comment is the 
appropriateness of using veil-piercing to impose contractual 
obligations on a seller whose alter ego is a protected “third party” to 
the transaction. If a seller conveys rights to property that he or she, 
in fact, owns either personally or through a corporation of which he 
or she is a majority owner, the balancing test required in veil-
piercing analysis weighs in favor of piercing the corporate veil. It is 
clearly against public policy, as set forth in article 2500, for the 
vendor to withhold rights to property that he or she has conveyed. 
The incentives for allowing a seller to shield him or herself as a 
“third party” do not find themselves in corporate law but, instead, in 
the seller’s attempt to protect property in a way that the law does not 
allow. 
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